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Abstract 
 Cost growth is a problem DoD wide.  Cost Estimators attempt to remedy this 
problem by accounting for uncertainty in the estimates they complete.  They use tools 
such as Engineering Change Orders (ECO’s) to account for the uncertainty, by applying a 
percentage to the final amount estimated.  The following research gives the acquisition 
community a more precise tool to predict whether a DoD Acquisition Contract will have 
an Engineering Change Order, which can then be used also during programmatic cost 
estimating, and also a method for predicting the proper amount of ECO to apply when 
certain variables are present.  The study used both logistic and multiple regression to 
accomplish this.  For both types of regression a stepwise approach was adopted for the 
response.  For the Logistic Regression the Y variable was that an ECO was present and 
the significant predictor variables were: UAV, >500M (dollars), Navy, Army, Aircraft, 
Firm Fixed Price (FFP), Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) and <5M (dollars).  The final model 
was 85% predictive.  The multiple regression modeled the expected ECO percent change 
(less than 100% of baseline).  Predictive variables included: <5M, FFP, Munition, 
Electronics and Missiles, along with a base amount of 22% ECO.  This model was more 
exploratory in nature due to the extreme variability present in ECO percent changes. 
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I.  Introduction 
General Issue 
 When it comes to budget decisions for the Department of Defense (DoD), cost 
estimates drive the amount of funding placed on all contract types. The accuracy of cost 
estimates is imperative so as to ensure the proper amount of money is set aside by 
Congress to acquire the weapon systems and platforms needed to complete the U.S. 
military missions. Furthermore, cost estimates are what drive the Acquisition Program 
Baseline (APB), which is the determined amount of funds allocated to an acquisition 
program.  Historically, these estimates have been wrought with inaccuracies due to cost-
overruns and mission creep. Cost overruns refer to going over the budget, and mission 
creep refers to added features that come with added costs to budget baselines. 
Cost overruns repeatedly show that estimates are predicted too low in comparison 
to the actual execution cost for an acquisition programs. According to DeNeve, 
“inaccurate cost estimates are a recurrent problem for Department of Defense (DoD) 
acquisition programs, with cost overruns exceeding billions of dollars each year. These 
estimate errors hinder the ability of the DoD to assess the affordability of future programs 
and properly allocate resources to existing programs (DeNeve, 2014, ii).” With the DoD 
operating in a more fiscally constrained environment due to shrinking budgets and 
sequestration, the accuracy of estimates created by the Air Force Life Cycle Management 
Center (AFLCMC), Air Force Cost Analysis Agency (AFCAA), and similar agencies 
from other branches of the military are now an essential topic of discussion.   
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 In order to purchase any item, however, a contract must be set in place because 
contracts are the means by which programs are carried out and executed. A significant 
aspect of any contract is the cost estimate associated with the specific item(s) a program 
desires to acquire. When accomplishing cost estimates, agencies do their best to find 
programs who previously purchased similar items as a reference point for the new item 
they want to purchase. This is oftentimes a reasonably accurate approach to account for 
existing items. However, due to the ever improving and evolving weapons systems, there 
are also unknowns that must be taken into account.  
One of the main methods the DoD implements into both the development cost and 
the production cost estimates are Engineering Change Orders (ECOs). ECOs are blanket 
percentage amounts added into the cost that the estimate compiles. As a rule of thumb, 
for development cost estimates, a ten percent cost is added to the estimate; whereas, for 
production estimates, a five percent cost is added. A recent study conducted by Valentine 
(2015) indicated that the ten percent charge added to estimates for development may not 
be accurate: “The ECO factor for Air Force, cost-type development contracts tend to 
follow a probability distribution” (Valentine, 2015, 34). That study was the basis for this 
thesis; Valentine acknowledges more research is required into ECO’s to make them into 
an accurate measure. 
Problem Statement 
 Cost estimating methods are limited to the accepted standards that are already set 
in place. The overall ECO percentages that are applied to programs are never altered, 
even if programs go over budget and need to be re-baselined.  Even when ECO 
3 
percentages are applied, the length of the contract or the type of system being acquired is 
not considered. Even though there are historical inaccuracies on initial cost estimating as 
well as a tendency for contracts to go over their intended amounts, ECOs remain either 
overlooked or not even considered as a source of cost growth  
Research Objective 
 This thesis focuses on ECOs and the actual historical funding that was spent over 
the course of a contract as a result of specified engineering changes. The purpose of this 
research is to establish proper resource allocations and affordability estimates that can be 
implemented early on in the Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) process. Our 
objective is to either find a better way to account for ECOs, other than a set standard 
percentage, or find a more appropriate percentage to add to an estimate, one that will 
properly capture the desired item to be procured.  Factors that may influence the proper 
application of ECOs include service branch, type of acquisition program, and length of 
program. The purpose of this thesis is move ECOs from a mere placeholder to a valuable 
tool at the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) disposal.  
Investigative Questions 
 These are the questions our research desires to answer:  
1. How can logistic regression incorporate common variables to accurately predict 
whether a contract will contain an ECO? 
2. Using a multiple regression model, what is the appropriate percentage to be 
applied to cost contracts based off of certain common variables that will 
accurately depict the proper amount of ECOs? 
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Methodology 
 This study concentrated on as many DoD acquisition contracts as possible, to 
include a wide spectrum of various programs and weapon systems. This was 
accomplished under the assumption that in order for DoD mandated programs to execute 
properly, contracts must be seen as the building blocks. The contracts considered in this 
thesis are from all four major branches of the military, both development and production 
type contracts.  However, it should be noted that only historical contracts that have 
already been executed will be examined.  
 The beginning phase of this study involved acquiring data from a Defense Cost 
and Resource Center (DCaRC) database created by a company called Techonomics. This 
data base contains historical contract information, to include: initial award amount, total 
baseline, award plus baseline growth, cost growth, schedule related costs, and most 
importantly, technical costs, which denote the ECO amount.   
 Once the data was obtained and compiled, statistical software such as JMP® or 
Excel were used to model techniques to detect patterns and statistical significances.  To 
be specific two different regression were completed; first a Logistic Regression was run 
in order to predict whether a contact would contain ECO and Multiple Regression was 
then performed to predict the percent, on the contracts where ECO was present.  
Assumptions and Limitations 
 The contracts were retrieved from the Technomics Database; while they were 
collected in “no particular order”, they do not technically make up a random sample. 
Only Acquisitions Category (ACAT) Level I programs were analyzed in this thesis.   
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Furthermore, only executed contracts as well as unclassified contracts were considered 
for this study.  
Summary 
 In order for contracts to reflect the precise end amount, it is important to ensure 
that each method that go into a cost estimate is accurate. The current approach of 
predicting the amount of ECO based on two single-blanket amounts, in reality, may not 
be the best way to ensure accuracy of the amount placed on contracts.  
With this problem in mind, Chapter 2 delves into our literature review, which 
identifies further reasons for implementing an ECO percentage as well as to ascertain 
some of the reasons and implications for inaccurate cost estimates.  The literature review 
provides the basis with which we approached our data collection and methodologies 
discussed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we present the two different regression analyses 
results in addition to validating our various findings. Lastly, Chapter 5 provides our 
conclusions from the study and possible follow-on research for future researchers.  
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II. Literature Review 
Introduction 
 The process to acquire a new weapon system is lengthy and consists of numerous 
components. Accurate cost estimates that properly represent the cost of the components is 
important in order to capture the right amount of resources. Oftentimes cost estimates 
have been very inaccurate, causing numerous programs to exceed their allotted budgets. 
This act of going over budget is referred to as “cost overruns.” The purpose of this 
chapter is to summarize previous research that has been accomplished regarding cost 
overruns and their impact on DoD acquisition programs. Chapter 2 also analyzes the 
different methods of dealing with uncertainties and how risk can lead to cost overruns. 
One major component of cost overruns is covering the cost of unknowns or risks, 
such as technological advances or failures that cause changes in engineering. These costs 
are often covered by what is called a management reserve (MR). MRs are a certain 
portion of the program’s budget that is set aside to be used for changes that may come 
into play that are considered within the scope of a project. The specific nomenclature for 
these within-scope changes in engineering or technological design is referred to as 
Engineering Change Orders (ECOs).   The unknowns are referred to as uncertainty, and 
the more unknowns, the more ECOs are possible. Similarly, MR’s are “an important part 
of effective planning and control on defense contracts. Presumably, contracts with greater 
risk (uncertainty) will have a need for a greater MR budget” (Christensen, 2000, 191).  If 
ECO’s can more accurately be predicted they can lead to a more accurate application of 
MR’s throughout the estimating and contracting processes.  
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To initiate our thesis and meet our objectives, we start by looking at previous 
research accomplished in the acquisition arena. First, we look at cost overruns and cost 
growth to seek evidence of historical issues. Second, we examine management reserves 
and more specifically, how they attempt to account for risk and uncertainties. Third, we 
explore ECOs and what impact they have on MRs, which can lead to cost overruns.  
Cost Overruns 
To begin, we bring attention to the problem of cost growth. Research conducted 
by Arena, Leonard, Murray, and Younossi (2006) studied weapon system cost growth 
across all branches of the military.  Their primary source for acquiring data was via 
Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR), which were prepared by all major defense 
acquisition programs (MDAPs) to be presented to Congress.  Overall their research 
reviewed 220 programs from 1968-2003. The study measured cost growth using the 
current cost estimate for the program as a ratio to the percent of a prior cost estimate. 
Their research found that the final program cost was 46 percent higher than Milestone II 
(Milestone B, Figure 1) estimate, and 16 percent higher than Milestone III (Milestone C, 
Figure 1). The cost growth was shown to be 20 percent higher than the previous similar 
study conducted by their research group the RAND Corporation. Their study concluded 
that the DOD and Military Departments largely underestimated the cost of purchasing 
new weapons systems. We utilized this study to demonstrate how, historically, DoD cost 
estimates are inaccurate and much lower than the final cost of a material development’s 
life. 
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Ben-Ari, Berterau, Hofbauer, and Sanders (2010), is the next research used to 
exemplify the problem of cost growth. Ben-Ari et al.(2010) researched the root cause 
behind cost and schedules delays for MDAPs).  Their research was based on a 
 
Figure 1 Acquisition Process, USD (AT&L). (2015, January 7). Department of  
Defense Instruction 5000.02. 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) study that showed in FY2008 the 96 MDAPs 
went $296 billion dollars over budget.  For the purpose of our research, this study was 
used study to emphasize the problem cost overruns in the DoD.   
  To complete this study Ben-Ari et al. (2010) examined several variables to 
determine what may contribute to cost overruns. The variables were “realism of baseline 
program cost estimates, government management and oversight, the role of contractors 
and lead military services, levels of competition, and contract structures” (Ben-Ari et al., 
2010, 14).  They examined three data sources: SARs, Federal Procurement Data Systems 
(FPDS) and Department of Defense Budget Documents. Next, they looked at programs 
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that were in Milestone B or beyond which is “normally the initiation of an acquisition 
program. This common starting point ensured that only programs in a relatively mature 
acquisition phase are compared” (Ben-Ari et al., 2010, 14).  Ben-Ari et al., (2010) found 
that cost estimating was responsible for cost overruns by being overly optimistic. They 
found that time-costs were not impactful on cost overruns and that most of the patterns 
have other secondary or tertiary factors explaining cost overruns. They then suggested 
using more rigorous quantitative and qualitative research to find the root causes, which 
we attempted with our study. 
 To further examine this issue we look at an article by the GAO (2011). In 2011 
the GAO Director Sullivan made a statement before the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs on the trend in Nunn-McCurdy breaches, factors 
responsible for trends in the breaches, and tools besides Nunn-McCurdy that could be 
used to minimize cost-overruns. Nunn-McCurdy breaches occur when a programs unit 
cost exceeds certain thresholds. When this occurs congress must be notified. Sullivan 
stated that “Nunn-McCurdy breaches are often the result of multiple, interrelated factors. 
Our analysis of DOD data and SARs showed that the primary reasons cited for the unit 
cost growth that led to Nunn-McCurdy breaches were engineering and design issues, 
schedule issues, and quantity changes” (2011, 4). This is significant for the purpose of 
our study.  Engineering/design issues were the most cited as a cause of the breach, with 
fifty citations, the next closest was scheduling issues, which had forty-four citations.  
(Figure 2).   
 Sullivan (2011,6) states,  “to put programs in a position to minimize the risk of 
cost growth, DOD must use the tools available to it to establish programs in which there 
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is a match between requirements and resources—including funding— from the start and 
execute those programs using knowledge-based acquisition practices.” This tool as 
 
Figure 2 Factors Cited in SARs as being Responsible for Nunn-McCurdy Breaches, 
Sullivan (2011) 
described by Director Sullivan is what ECOs can and should be used for. Sullivan’s 
article demonstrated the commonality of cost overruns and the need for devices such as 
ECOs for the DoD to reign in cost-overruns. 
Through Calcutt’s study (1993), we were able to further address the causes of cost 
overruns. Calcutt (1993) studied the history of cost growth in the DoD. He acknowledged 
a large portion of the growth resulted from improperly accounting for uncertainty and 
risk. He created several recommendations, but his fourth suggestion is the most relevant 
to our research. Calcutt was interested in looking “further into MRs to study the impacts 
of them on other programs and what total would be required” (Calcutt 1993,5). Although 
this study only briefly mentions MRs, it does place an importance on them, along with 
the importance of keeping costs under control.  Calcutt also mentioned how the overrun 
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problem could become emphasized with shrinking budgets. He describes how companies 
will agree to lower amounts of contracts just to win them, which would in turn lead to 
cost overruns as contracts are actually executed.  
 Throughout these studies, the researcher’s emphasis is on inaccurate cost 
estimating and the impacts that not estimating correctly can have upon scarce financial 
resources. As found in previous studies, uncertainty is a very large portion of what leads 
to cost overruns. This concept is exemplified by Frank Husic (1968) when he described 
cost estimating relationships (CER).  In his research he expounded upon the fact that each 
piece of the estimate is comprised of smaller pieces, all of which must be accurate in 
order for the overall estimate to be accurate. Husic notes that “for each of a multitude of 
other important inputs, similar decisions are made, and a single aggregate cost is obtained 
as the output of the cost model” (Husic, 1968, 4).  Husic is implying that after all of the 
decisions are made, the smaller pieces are put together for a cost estimate. This is a key 
component to our study. The ECO is currently a small piece but it can have a very large 
impact on the final number.  
Management Reserve 
Tools are set in place, such as MRs, to act as pieces to the overall estimate. Kevin 
Gould (1995) offers an in-depth analysis of the usage of MRs in the DoD budgeting 
procedures.  Gould describes MRs as a budget that “is held in a reserve account 
controlled by the contractor project manager and is intended for management control 
purposes rather than designated for the accomplishment of a specific task or set of tasks” 
(Gould 1995, 2). He goes on to describe the necessity for such an allotment so as to 
create an incentive for doing a job efficiently and using the MR to account for in-scope 
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unanticipated growth changes. He found three methods for developing the MR: non-
participative, participative, and a combination of the two. Non-participative includes 
funds put in by upper-management, participative was done by lower levels, and a 
combination is simply using both methods together.   
To analyze MR usage, Gould’s methodology included a sample of five contractor 
system descriptions. Once he reviewed each description and compared the methods and 
procedures used by particular contractors with whom interviewed, he then looked for 
correlations. The interviews consisted of phone interviews, which were transcribed and 
verified by interviewees for completeness. After conducting his interviews and 
correlations, Gould found that no prescribed format existed by which contractors applied 
MRs; instead, he typically found that less than one page of the system description was 
dedicated to the development of the MR. This led to a confusing way of developing the 
MR, which he feels should be very straight forward.  For the purpose of our research, 
Gould showed that no industry accepted method of accounting exists for unknowns or 
risk using an MR.  
While MR’s are a tool used by estimators, they are not without problems. Some of 
these issues are addressed by Woodard (1983) who was critical of the method used by the 
DoD to account for risk and uncertainty in establishing budget baselines. He began his 
study by emphasizing the impact of inaccurate estimates on scarce resources: “Presently 
DoD is faced with the same problems of how to accurately estimate costs and control cost 
growth. Funds are limited and DoD has to compete with other increasing needs of the 
nation such as social welfare programs, energy, etc.”(1983, 5).  Within his research, 
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Woodward (1983, 5) only focused on development costs and attempted to answer three 
questions: 
1. Should MR’s be visible?  
2. Should a better approach be implemented estimate risk?  
3. Does another problem cause this uncertainty that has not been discussed?   
Woodward looked at the normal techniques of expert opinion, analogy, 
parametric, and a method of breaking down a project into segments. He called this 
method “Industrial Engineering Approach,”.  After looking at risk, he then talked about 
different methods of looking into uncertainty.  In his findings, Woodward (1983) 
concluded that three areas need to be considered regarding the management of risk and 
uncertainty: methodology, techniques, and databases. He found that no universal DoD 
policy occurred to establish MRs or account for uncertainty. He discussed how this is a 
political issue that needs to be formally recognized and standardized.  He proposed that 
the DoD had an issue where MRs were hidden to keep costs below certain levels, when 
instead MRs should be transparent. Woodward also noted that “better risk management 
techniques are needed rather than just developing more mathematical techniques to 
quantify risk” (1983, 108). What Woodward describes here is that besides simply adding 
mathematics techniques, more robust data must be applied that may be more qualitative 
real word correlations, such as analogous programs or similar contracting methods and 
how much they expanded in the past.  
Christensen and Templin (2000) further emphasized MRs analysis in their 
research.  This study began by defining an MR’s purpose as providing “an adequate 
budget for in-scope but unanticipated work on the contract. As a contract proceeds to 
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completion, an unanticipated, in-scope work is identified, an MR budget is allocated to 
that work” (Christensen and Templin, 2000, 910).  This is similar to Gould’s definition 
(1995, 191) of an MR with DoD Policy Documents: “the primary purpose of an MR 
budget is a reserve forum certainties related to in-scope but unforeseen work” (DoD, 
1997, 12). However, where Christensen’s study differs from Gould (1993) is that he 
sought to quantify an amount that should be applied to management reserves, instead of 
looking for patterns in a qualitative method. 
 To quantify the amount required for a management reserve, Christensen and 
Templin, (2000) relied on descriptive statistics.  They focused on the uncertainty of 
projects, where more uncertainty had more MR budget and less uncertainty had less MR 
budget.  Christensen and Templin. (2000, 196) started their research with 3 hypotheses:  
• H1o: Median MR percent development > Median MR percent production 
contracts 
 
• H1a: Median MR percent development contracts < Median MR percent 
production contracts 
 
• H2o: Median MR percent price contracts > Median MR percent cost contracts 
 
• H2a: Median MR percent price contracts < Median MR percent cost contracts 
 
 
• H3o: Median MR percent Army = Median MR percent Air Force =Median MR 
percent Navy contracts 
 
• H3a: Median MR percent Army ≠ Median MR percent Air Force ≠ Median MR 
percent Navy contracts 
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The data used to conduct these tests was pulled from a monthly cost and schedule 
database maintained by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition 
Technology and Logistics (OUSD AT&L), (Appendix B).  
 In the summary of their findings, Christensen and Templin (2000, 199) had mixed 
results for their hypotheses. Their first hypothesis looked at the median MR between 
production and development contracts and found that development was higher, but the 
results were not statistically significant. Null 1 could not be rejected. For Hypothesis 2, 
the median MR percent on fixed-price contracts was greater than the firm on cost equals 
reimbursable. The difference was significant so they rejected the null. The null 
Hypothesis 3 was also rejected, demonstrating that the MR budget is sensitive to the 
branch managing the contract. Christensen’s study was vital to the research we conduct 
as they looked at the big picture of total MRs; whereas, our study looked at one 
component of MRs, being that of ECOs. The difference being that ECO’s focus on 
engineering changes, and MRs look at all uncertainty within scope of a contract.  
Engineering Change Orders 
To focus in specifically on ECOs, we looked at an NRO Cost Group (2005) study 
that was one of the first to focus on engineering changes and their impact on the final 
bottom line of an independent cost estimate (IDE). This study was limited, but it shed 
light on the issues surrounding how much should be included in an estimate to best 
compensate for 
The NRO Cost Group analyzed 21 space related programs that ranged from 4 
million dollars to 4 billion dollars. In this study, engineering change orders are referred to 
as “engineering change proposals,” but they are the same by definition. The research 
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showed that, of the expected cost growth contained in the program, approximately 20%-
30% would be for new technical scope, which contained the ECOs.  Some total cost 
growth can be as much as 200%, which indicates that the majority of the growth is not 
solely contained in  ECOs; however, a large portion is reflected in them and if the ECO’s 
are not accurate than the overall accuracy will be lower, even if variables other than 
ECO’s also caused cost growth. 
Another study conducted by Valentine (2015) set out to analyze the effect of 
ECOs on cost growth.  He narrowed his search to an Air Force specific contract type. 
Valentine noted that “the purpose of this study is to develop an estimating technique to 
account for the additional costs associated with Engineering Change Orders (ECOs) for 
cost-type development contracts” (Valentine 2015, 3).  He used a data base that was 
contracted from the Defense Cost and Resource Center (DCARC), which compiled 
finished contracts.  The contracts were then separated into four different categories as, 
Initial Award, Total Baseline, Cost and Technical. Initial Award was calculated to show 
the cost of the contract at award; The Total Baseline was analyzed to show the initial 
award plus the base cost growth; Cost denoted the cost overruns; and Technical showed 
the ECO costs added to the original baseline.  
Next, Valentine created a probability distribution with the conditional probability 
where an ECO is greater than 0.  To derive an accurate distribution, outliers were 
removed. Then, the ECO was divided by total contract value. After his analysis, 
Valentine (2015) found that “the ECO factor for Air Force, cost-type development 
contracts tends to follow a probability distribution where the frequency is higher for 
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lower ECO factors and gradually declines as the ECO factors increase” (3).  He then 
recommends three follow-on research ideas:  
• Determining why so many development contracts have $0 ECO 
• Determining why some contracts exhibit extraordinary ECO growth 
• Determining if ECO factor study may prove even more relevant with respect to 
procurement contracts  
 
This is similar to the basis for our study, except we investigated: 
1. Is it possible to predict whether a contract will have an ECO or not? 
2. Where an ECO is present, can an accurate percentage be applied to cost estimates or 
contract amounts that will accurately depict the proper amount of ECO Growth 
throughout the life of the contract? 
Summary 
In this Literature Review we reviewed previously completed research that focused 
on cost overruns and their impact on DoD acquisition programs. We showed how cost 
overruns have a negative effect on the DoD by tying up funds that could be allocated in a 
more efficient manner.  Additionally, we show how different organizations have 
attempted to reign in the cost growth, and we attempt another method to assist in this. We 
also found studies representing MR uses and procedures to account for uncertainties and 
risk, by adding on certain amounts to the bottom line of estimates to account for these 
unseen amounts.  Finally ECOs were observed to illustrate how they can be a useful tool 
to account for unknowns, along with how some preliminary studies have shown the 
inaccuracies of current ECO usage.  In the next chapter, we explain the methodology 
used to define correlations between ECOs in DoD Contracts. 
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III.  Methodology 
 The purpose of Chapter 3 is to explain the methodology used in this thesis. We 
begin our discussion with our problem statement as well as the source of the data. This 
includes limitations and the methods to choose and organize the data. Next, we define our 
variables that correspond to our research questions and objectives. Third, we discuss the 
regression methods both linear and multiple along with the outcomes of the regression. 
Finally, we discuss the application of multiple regression analysis. This final application 
serves as the statistical basis for predicting the usage of ECOs along with the proper 
percentage amounts that should be added onto estimates.  
Problem Statement 
 As stated in Chapter 1 cost estimating methods are currently limited to the 
accepted standards that are in place. The overall ECOs percentages applied remain the 
same even when programs go over budget.  While some ECO’s have zero ECO and some 
have a very large amount, the same blanket assumption is placed upon all total amounts, 
which skews the average. Also, the length of the contract or type of system being 
acquired is not considered in applying the ECO percentages. Despite historical 
shortcomings across the board on initial cost estimating, the system for developing ECOs 
has not changed.  
Database 
 The data derived for this study came from the database of a company called 
Technomics.  The database was commissioned by the Defense Cost and Resource Center 
(DCaRC). It contains historical contracts, taken directly out of the Electronic Database 
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Access (EDA), that were compiled into a usable form.  This was more useful than current 
contracts because the amounts are not subject to change. While this makes the data more 
usable, it does not take into effect current funding situations. This could come into play 
during the initial budgeting of more recent contracts.  This data is limited by the historical 
aspect as well as the reliance on Technomics properly archiving the data without altering 
it from the original source, EDA.  EDA is a website that contains the electronic copy of 
government documents, including DoD contracts, which were used in this research.  
 The database is broken down into a usable tool called the “Interactive Contract 
Database and Analysis Tool.” The tool is divided into several search options, which are 
found under the contract growth factors. The contract information features a selection for 
the branch of service: Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corp. The contract growth 
factor features the production phase: development, production, or operations and support 
(O&S).  Another option includes Commodity, which is the type of weapon system. The 
last selection under that search option is Contract Type, which are the type of contracts 
used for the weapon system (Appendix B).  
For our research, the database was narrowed to ten categories. The first 3 identify 
the program: Contract Number, Description, and Program. Next are the headlines that are 
important to our research. Initial Award is the amount that is originally provided to fund a 
program. Baseline Growth is how much the contract grew in the life of the program. 
Total Baseline is the amount added together. Lastly, Technical is the key to this study.  
The column labeled “Technical” is the most important piece of our study as it 
represents the amount spent on the programs ECOs. The Air Force Cost Analysis Agency 
(AFCAA) defines Technical as an “engineering change order or proposal dependent on 
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ICE (Independent Cost Estimate) method” (2009, 5). The comparison of the Technical 
amount compared to the original and baseline, is the basis for this research (Appendix C). 
Once the data was accessed it was first normalized to Base Year 2017 to ensure 
all of the amounts accounted for the same amount due to inflation. Next it was moved 
from Technomics Database to Excel where if/then statements were used to find the 
presence of variables.  After the variables were sorted out, they were imported into the 
JMP System in order to be analyzed. Care was taken to ensure the data was not altered in 
any way during the transfer process, which included double checks and spot checks of the 
data before and after moving it. In total, 3,399 contracts were analyzed. 
After the data was moved into JMP, it was divided by branch of service, 
commodity type, contract type, and whether it was a development contract or a 
production contract. We converted these to binary variables with a “1” being assigned to 
the presence of the variable and a “0” if not. We divided the data as such to better 
differentiate between variables. Even though these divisions were sufficient for our 
research, it can be noted that the operators at Technomics used the EDA to find and break 
down the contracts by purpose and further read through the contract in order to separate 
out the reasons for the cost growth. (Appendix E) 
Hypotheses 
 This thesis contains a two-pronged approach to predicting ECO’s in the DoD. 
First, a logistic regression model was developed to establish whether an ECO was present 
in the criteria contained within a contract. Second, a multiple regression model was built 
in order to predict the percentage of an ECO, once the presence of an ECO is detected.  
21 
Logistic Regression  
 The function form of the logistic model appears as: 
 
𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥) =
𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥)
𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) + 1
 
 
where 
0 1 1( ) p pf x X Xβ β β= + + +  
Our Logistic Regression data needed to be separated into binary variables. In total there 
were 34 predictor variables (see Appendix E for a detailed description) among our four 
categories of branch, commodity, production phase, and contract type and Positive ECO 
Yes/No. We represent a positive ECO with a “1” being given for a “yes,” while a 
negative or no ECO is coded with a “0”. Two addition binary variables were added on 
top of the ones provided by Technomics. The first was an additional dichotomous 
variable for contracts under 5 Million dollars and the second variable was for all contracts 
over 500 Million. These were both added after it was observed that they might be 
statistically significant. After the dichotomous variables were added, a random number 
was assigned to each contract and the random numbers were put in order from largest to 
smallest. The first 680 were removed from the analysis, composing 20% of the database 
for validation, leaving 80% available for analysis. 
Analysis Conducted 
 A mixed stepwise procedure was run on the 80% analysis set of variables where 
the ECO/Yes variable was the “Y Variable” and the X Variable was a comparison of all 
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of the binary variables with an α of 0.10.  This produced a fit model consisting of the 
common model effect of the branch, commodity, contract types, and bucket variables. 
We then tested the model to see how well it performed using an α of 0.1, due to the 
exploratory nature of the analysis. The Odds Ratio or OR was analyzed for the significant 
variables, which an OR equal to 1 indicates the explanatory variable does not affect the 
odds of a program experiencing an ECO.  An OR > 1 implies a higher odds of an ECO, 
while an OR < 1 suggests a lower odds of experiencing an ECO (Szumilas, 2010).  With 
respect to the confidence interval of an odds ratio, either the lower or upper confidence 
bound is used to estimate the precision of the OR.  In practice, this bound is often used as 
a proxy for the presence of statistical significance if it does not overlap the null value 
(e.g., OR = 1) (Szumilas, 2010).  
Next the Receiver Operator Characteristic or ROC curve was run, containing the 
Area under the Curve (AUC) were compared to test the model. “ROC plot displays the 
performance of a binary classification method with continuous or discrete ordinal output. 
It shows the sensitivity (the proportion of correctly classified positive observations) and 
specificity (the proportion of correctly classified negative observations) as the output 
threshold is moved over the range of all possible values. ROC curves do not depend on 
class probabilities, facilitating their interpretation and comparison across different data 
sets…. In the ROC context, the AUC measures the performance of a classifier and is 
frequently applied for method comparison. A higher AUC means a better classification 
(Robin, 2011)”. 
The AUC indicates the sorting efficiency of a model with a value of 0.5 indicating 
merely random chance and a value of 1.0 indicating perfect prediction capabilities 
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(Gaudard, Ramsey, & Stephens, 2006).  The AUC is a single measure of the overall 
discrimination ability of a test.  In general, an AUC that is greater than 0.8 suggests that 
the diagnostics test has good discriminatory power (McPherson & Pincus, 2016: 80).  
The AUC was then bootstrapped 1000 times to generate a CI to assess the over-all 
accuracy of the model. This technique called bootstrapping (Efron & Tibshirani, 1994) 
presents a 90% confidence interval for the AUC value for the logistic regression model; 
this interval provides the user predictive limitations of the model. 
Finally the 80% analysis set of data was run through the probability formula to 
predict the ‘yes’ result, which was later compared to the actual ‘yes’ variables where 
ECO’s were present. The agreement between the two was then shown in a distribution 
and compared to the 20% that had been previously separated as a crosscheck  
Logistic Regression Results 
After enacting the methodology discussed in earlier, we arrived at the model 
presented in Tables 1-4. The Logistic Regression was found to reliably predict whether or 
not an ECO will be present with approximately an 81% accuracy rate. These results were 
tested using the Effects Summary, Parameter Estimates, and Effect Likelihood tests from 
the fit model (Table 3). A whole model p-value of <.0001, is much less than the pre-
established limit of .1 as stated previously (Table 2), along with the individual P-values 
of the variables shown on the Effect Summary in the same table.  The Effects Likelihood 
Ratio Tests result in demonstrating the productiveness of the variables from Greatest to 
least, with the greatest being X1 and the least being X8 (Table 1.) 
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Table 1 Variables with P Values 
X Value Variable Description P-Value 
X1 Contract amount is < 5M Dollars <0.0001 
X2 Contract is a Firm Fixed Price <0.0001 
X3 Contract consists of a Commodity of Aircraft  <0.0001 
X4 Contract amount is > 500M Dollars  <0.0001 
X5 Contract is an Army Contract <0.0001 
X6 Contract is a Navy Contract <0.0001 
X7 Contract consists of a Commodity of UAV <0.0001 
X8 Contract is a Cost Plus Fixed Fee Contract 0.0009 
 
Next, the Odds Ratio or OR reinforces the variables that show a positive influence 
on the outcome as being over 1 and those that show a negative outcome as being below 1 
(Table 5). Another indicator that this model is a good predictor of whether or not an ECO 
will be present in a contract is that of the ROC AUC. Our model shows an AUC of .8860 
(Figure 3), which is considered good to borderline excellent as it is close to 90%.  The 
1000 bootstrap iterations reveal an average AUC of. 0.887 with a 95% C.I. of (.87, .90), 
(Figure 4) and reinforces the significant result. 
Table 2 Whole Model Test 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 548.0892 8 1096.178 <.0001* 
Full 981.4624    
Reduced 1529.5516    
 
 
The model further demonstrates its accuracy through a graphical distribution of 
the agreement between the true binary 1 Yes Response and the predict response. Using 
the 80% analysis file, the model properly predicted the outcome 83% of the time. 
Additionally, when using the 20% analysis crosscheck, the model predicted the outcome 
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81% of the time (Figure 5). After analyzing the Data, the selected formula was derived 
from the parameter model estimates and provides a working example of our model. The 
working outputs also validate the influence of each variable as a predictor. The likelihood 
follows the formula: (Table 1 and Table 5) 
ECO is present= 𝑒𝑒
(2.14−1.02𝑋𝑋1−2.78𝑋𝑋2−.62𝑋𝑋3−1.88𝑋𝑋4−1.04𝑋𝑋5−1.38𝑋𝑋6−.62𝑋𝑋7−2.28𝑋𝑋8)
1+𝑒𝑒(2.14−1.02𝑋𝑋1−2.78𝑋𝑋2−.62𝑋𝑋3−1.88𝑋𝑋4−1.04𝑋𝑋5−1.38𝑋𝑋6−.62𝑋𝑋7−2.28𝑋𝑋8)
 
Table 3 Effects Test/P-Values 
Effects Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R 
ChiSquare 
Prob>ChiSq  
UAV 1 1 19.3240262 <.0001*  
>500M 1 1 70.6220125 <.0001*  
Navy 1 1 20.8205073 <.0001*  
Army 1 1 25.8933553 <.0001*  
Aircraft 1 1 59.8551842 <.0001*  
FFP 1 1 71.8381697 <.0001*  
CPFF 1 1 11.0573064 0.0009*  
<5M 1 1 408.865564 <.0001*  
 
l 
Table 4 Odds Ratio 
Unit Odds Ratio 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
UAV 0.359959 0.226466 0.568625 2.7780972 
>500M 16.05503 7.252851 42.82052 0.0622858 
Navy 0.53527 0.40943 0.699719 1.8682176 
Army 0.152588 0.067345 0.325468 6.5535973 
Aircraft 0.354032 0.271516 0.460836 2.824602 
FFP 0.252695 0.183773 0.346938 3.9573323 
CPFF 0.538307 0.372705 0.775773 1.8576754 
<5M 0.10194 0.080671 0.128331 9.809653 
 
 
Also Table 5 contains the ChiSquare output, which shows the strongest 
association. The <5M variable is the most dominant with a ChiSquare Score of 372.03, 
and the FFP is the second most dominant with a score of 72.10. The least dominant is 
CPFF with a score of 10.98. 
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Table 5 Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimates 
Term  Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept[0]  2.14021125 0.1755113 148.70 <.0001* 
UAV  -1.0217662 0.2345743 18.97 <.0001* 
>500M  2.77602209 0.445714 38.79 <.0001* 
Navy  -0.6249848 0.1366438 20.92 <.0001* 
Army  -1.8800141 0.4000996 22.08 <.0001* 
Aircraft  -1.0383675 0.134888 59.26 <.0001* 
FFP  -1.3755701 0.1620023 72.10 <.0001* 
CPFF  -0.6193259 0.1869091 10.98 0.0009* 
<5M  -2.2833669 0.1183822 372.03 <.0001* 
 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic          
 
 
Figure 3 ROC Curve 
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Boot Strapping Summary Statistics 
  
 
 
Mean 0.8874497 
Std Dev 0.0066915 
Std Err Mean 0.0002116 
Upper 95% Mean 0.8878649 
Lower 95% Mean 0.8870345 
N 1000 
 
 
 
Confidence Limits 
Coverage Pct Lower Pct Upper 
0.95 0.87408 0.90012 
0.90 0.8764 0.89838 
0.80 0.87883 0.89602 
0.50 0.8829 0.89212 
 
Figure 4 Bootstrapping 
 
80% Analysis Agreement 20% Analysis CrossCheck 
 
 
Level  Count Prob 
0 464 0.17059 
1 2256 0.82941 
Total 2720 1.00000 
 
 
Level  Count Prob 
0 136 0.20029 
1 543 0.79971 
Total 679 1.00000 
 
Figure 5 Predicted Percentage 
Multiple Regression 
The Multiple Regression gave us an answer we believe to be reliable; however, 
due to the unaccounted variance in the form of the low R2, lack of normality, and 
constant variance, lends toward the conclusion that the multiple regression “exploratory” 
may be necessary to ensure the accuracy of the result.  
0.865 0.875 0.885 0.895 0.905
0 1
0 1
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Analysis Conducted 
When setting up our multiple regression model, any contract that contained a 
positive ECO was pulled out of the total data set to make sure that the negative or zero 
amounts did not overly influence the outcomes. Afterwards, a new variable was added 
where the ECO Amount was divided by the Total Baseline amount to give a numeric 
representation of what percentage the ECO has upon the Total Baseline Amount. This 
resulted in 850 of the 3399 being selected.  To eliminate outliers those contracts where 
ECO percentages surpassed 100% of the original Baseline Amount were excluded.  
These were determined to be special case situations such as the MRAP program which 
was brought on by a need and funded using a UCA or undefinitized contracting action, 
which is essentially a blank check. The need for the MRAP in tactical environment to 
combat IED’s and save coalition lives created a scenario where contracting rules were 
bent. Another example is the B-2 Sprint Contract where the initial statement of work did 
not contain the full scope of the program.  After removed those extreme percentages who 
met this criteria, 674 remained for analysis.  
 The next step was to run a stepwise procedure to produce a fit model with the 
percentage of the ECO to Baseline as the Y variable and the same X variables from 
before. The output formula from the statistically significant variables is: 
 
After the regression was run and we obtained the diagnostic results, we then ran through 
the Cooks-D Test to test for influential data points.  “Cook’s Distance is commonly used 
in multiple regression analysis to interpret each data point’s influence on the regression 
results and can easily highlight outliers through a graphical interface and a corresponding 
0 1 1( ) p pf x X Xβ β β= + + +
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“score” for each data point between 0 and 1.  An overly-influential data point can be 
potentially harmful in a regression model, due to the fact that it over-fits the regression 
output to include that one instance.  In essence, it influences the model to behave more 
like the one observed outcome than the population as a whole.  When utilizing Cook’s 
Distance, we are alerted to any possible points which need to be analyzed more closely 
by a score of between .1 and .5.  (Cook, 1977). 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) scores were checked to look for multi-
collinearity. The VIF measures how much multicollinearity has increased the variance of 
an estimate, meaning that it measures and indicates the magnitude that a single predictor 
variable influences the outcome of a multiple-regression model (Stine, 1995). Next, the 
residuals produced from the regression were tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk 
Test. The null hypothesis for the S-W test is that the residuals from our model are 
normally distributed; the alternative hypothesis is that they are not.  We test this at a 
threshold of α = .05.  If the p-value for the test is larger than .05, then we satisfy the 
assumption of normality for our models (Neter et al., 1996:111). Constant variance was 
tested using the Breusch Pagan Test. The second of the two key assumptions of any 
multiple regression model is that it contains constant variance.  The Breusch-Pagan (B-P) 
test is used to statistically prove whether residuals exhibit constant variance or not.   
Multiple Regression Results 
 A fit model was conducted using the 674 responses, with the Percentage of ECO 
under 100% as the Y variable and the X variable being the 34 stated as before (Appendix 
E). The fit models output included an analysis of Variance, and Parameter estimates, 
including the VIF Scores shown as in (Table 7).  Next Cooks-D was used to show that 
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none of the points had undue influence on the model (Figure 7). The final test of the 
diagnostics was the Studentized Residuals (Figure 8), which showed than none of that 
residuals contained more than 3 standard deviations from the mean. An overall ANOVA 
P value of <.00001, along with the previously stated test initially indicate a good model. 
If these diagnostics held true the output predictive model looks like this from the 
parameter Estimate (Table7):  
( )f x = (22.46%) + (18.4%)X1 − (5.7%)X2 − (11.4)X3 − (7.0%)X4 + (14.6%)X5 
This is telling us that 22.46% should be the base amount of ECO placed upon 
contracts that show they most likely will have an ECO based on the Logistic Model 
Equation, plus or minus the percentages of the variables above. However this is where the 
accuracy of the model stopped and the “noise” from the many variables, influence on the 
model began to show. 
Table 6 Significant Variables 
X Value Variable Description P-Value 
X1 Contract consists of a Commodity of Electronics 0.00710 
X2 Contract consists of a Commodity of Missiles 0.00770 
X3 Contract consists of a Commodity of Munitions 0.00270 
X4 Contract is a Firm Fixed Price 0.00010 
X5 Contract amount is < 5M Dollars <0.00001 
 
To begin with, the variance explained by the R2 was a mere .13 (Figure 8), this 
meant that a large portion of the data relation to the numbers went unaccounted for.   
Also, as expected the regression model failed normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test 
(Figure 8). The expectation going in was that this test of Normality was going to fail, 
simply based on the amounts and how the contract amounts vary so much and how the 
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amounts of ECO go from 0% to over 90% without any indication. There are a decent 
amount around the 20% margin which should show us that that is a safe amount, however 
there are too many variables that do not fit into the mold, that Normality is not met. 
Finally the assumption of constant variance was failed using the Breusch Pagan test 
(Appendix F) with a p-value of .0 e-21. This goes hand in hand with the normality tests 
being failed; if a model is not normally distributed the constant variance is usually not 
present either.  Table 7 also demonstrates the t Ratio which represents the variables that 
are the most and least dominant of the significant variables. In this case the most 
dominant is the variable of <5M with a t Ratio of 6.81 and the least most dominant 
variable is FFP with a t Ratio of -3.86.  
Table 7 P-Value/Parameter Estimates 
Analysis of Variance 
Source  DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean Square F Ratio 
Model  5 5.243683 1.04874 19.3060 
Error  668 36.287053 0.05432 Prob > F 
C. Total  673 41.530736  <.0001* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term  Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| VIF 
Intercept  0.2246312 0.015988 14.05 <.0001* . 
Electronics  0.1843034 0.068196 2.70 0.0071* 1.0090594 
Missiles   -0.057143 0.02138  -2.67 0.0077* 1.0355453 
Munitions   -0.114471 0.038027  -3.01 0.0027* 1.0250289 
FFP   -0.070095 0.01817  -3.86 0.0001* 1.011097 
<5M  0.1460461 0.021445 6.81 <.0001* 1.0150336 
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Figure 6 Cooks D 
 
Studentized Residuals Summary Statistics 
 
Mean  -8.813e-6 
Std Dev 1.0010934 
Std Err Mean 0.0385607 
Upper 95% 
Mean 
0.0757049 
Lower 95% 
Mean 
 -
0.075723 
N 674 
 
Figure 7 Studentized Residuals 
Summary 
In this chapter we first discussed the source of the data, and how it was taken from its 
original form and separated off for analysis. Second we discussed the variables being 
analyzed and how they were divided up. Third, we discussed the methods used to analyze 
the variables. We first attempted to predict whether a contract would have an ECO and 
the accuracy of this prediction.  Next we discussed the second regression we ran, the 
multiple regression to see what percentage of ECO should be applied to the contract, 
along the various methods used to verify the results of the tests.  After all of the 
-2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
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predictors could be derived along with some of the predictors requiring more analysis 
into their original causes, designating them as exploratory analysis. 
 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.12626 
RSquare Adj 0.11972 
Root Mean Square Error 0.233071 
Mean of Response 0.202018 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 674 
 
Goodness of Fit  
 
Fitted Normal 
Parameter Estimates 
Type Parameter Estimate Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Location μ 1.515e-17  -0.017562 0.0175618 
Dispersion σ 0.2322033 0.2204342 0.2453099 
 
-2log(Likelihood) = -56.5424931787367 
Goodness-of-Fit Test 
 Shapiro-Wilk W Test 
W  Prob<W 
0.864027   <.0001* 
 
Figure 8 Fit Tests 
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IV. Chapter Conclusions and Recommendations. 
Introduction  
 The intent of this chapter is to explain our findings and make recommendations 
for future research in the field of ECO’s so as to answer any questions remaining after 
this study.  The major outcome from our analysis will hopefully shed light on the concept 
of the Engineering Change Order and how it can drastically affect both cost and cost 
growth in the DoD Acquisition Contracts and Programs as a whole. First, we revisit the 
research questions of this study to validate the outcomes versus the intent of this 
undertaking. Next, we describe the limitations of this study, and how future studies may 
be able to overcome them. Finally we conclude with a brief summary of what this study 
accomplished. 
Research Questions Answered 
1.  How can logistic regression incorporate common variables to accurately predict 
whether a contract will contain an ECO? 
 Regarding the final model created and the data that was available through the 
Technomics Contract Database, the answer is yes. Applying certain variables that are 
statistically significant can be used with 81% accuracy to predict whether or not a 
contract will have an ECO attached to it. All the necessary variables should be known by 
the contracting personnel during the creation of the contract.  
2.   Using a multiple regression model, what is the appropriate percentage to be applied 
to cost contracts based off of certain common variables that will accurately depict the 
proper amount of ECOs?  
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 With respect to the final model created in the previous chapter the answer is yes; 
however, more exploration into this data will be required to ensure the accuracy of the 
model.   Due to the noise created b narrowing of the binary variables, this is described in 
greater detail under limitations.  
 Some similar variables appear both as significant for the logistic regression and 
the multiple regression; those are contracts which have a baseline amount of less than 5 
Million dollars and those that are Firm Fixed Price. The first point is supported by a 
finding from Dameron (2001), “Contract Data mimics patterns in SAR data in the shape 
of the cost growth distribution and trends for tolerance of cost growth, i.e., higher cost 
growth for smaller programs”. While the smaller contracts are significant they are 
negatively correlated, thus have less of a chance of having an ECO. This makes sense in 
that the contracts that have a small amount probably do not cover a lot of different 
variables and or line items; thus there are less reasons or opportunities for them to 
expand. However if they do contain an ECO for some reason they will have an extra 
14.6% than the already recommended 22.5%; in that if they do have an ECO it will be a 
much larger percentage, such as Dameron (2001), found.  Basically, if a 1 Million Dollar 
Contract grows by 1 Million then that is 100% growth, while if a 10 Million Dollar 
Contract Grows by 1 Million then it is only 1% cost growth.  
 Likewise, a FFP would less reason to have an ECO present or a reason to have an 
expansion of the final amount in that there is no incentive to keep the amount low, in the 
rigidity of the contract. Therefore without an incentive the only way to get more money is 
to expand the scope, which can will entail an ECO if growth is deemed necessary.  FFP 
contract by their nature do not adjust to pricing changes or profitability by the contractor. 
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These while less likely to occur, are subject to alterations after the fact instead of in the 
process of the contract itself, such as a cost plus fixed fee contract, where the contractor 
would have incentive to keep the cost low during actual process of the contract.  
 As for similarities to previously studies, for comparison, Valentine (2009) found 
that that development ECO should be above 20%; we concur with this assessment. 
However, along with looking at only Air Force cost contracts, Valentine separated 
Production from Development contracts. This study looked into separating this during out 
regression tests. We held Production and Development as variables and they did not 
register as significant, therefore we did not separate them for the analysis.  
Limitations 
 We recognize this study contains several limitations. First, the sample of contracts 
used for the analysis are not completely random. Even though the contracts are collected 
for analysis without prejudice, as long as they are ACAT 1 and already fully 
accomplished, they still were personally requested, thereby making them not completely 
random. While it is impossible to collect all of the historical contract in the DoD, this 
sample was useful for analysis. There are several other reasons for extreme ECO growth, 
based on the few contracts sampled. On two of the sampled contracts, the scope of the 
effort was not inherent in the initial statement of work; this caused the contract to be 
expanded exponentially. Another contract began as a small support contract, but ECO’s 
became the tools used as the scope of the program changed and CLINs were added as the 
project expanded. Another contract started as a service type and it is unknown why the 
contract was funded with 3600 money, which is the code for Air Force Research and 
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Development dollars, instead of Information Support, which should be coded as 3400 or 
Operations and Maintenance.  This resulted in additional noise due to improper 
classification of funds.  
 Second, while the reasons for cost growth are widely accepted categories by the 
DoD, there are multiple reasons for them to occur, which skews the data immensely. For 
instance, ECO’s alone have 18 variables (Appendix G), or reasons why it is classified as 
an ECO, but this would require going through each contract individually and finding the 
exact reason for the growth. This variability accounts for additional “noise,” which make 
the data have an extremely wide range. The numerous variables that go into each 
category for cost growth must also be considered in order to get a full picture on why 
percentages are so vast.  
 Along those same lines contracts are developed at different times for different 
reasons. Contracts like the MRAP were created in a hurry using a barely legal Un-
differentiated Contact Action or UCA, which is almost a blank check and that program 
resulted in almost 220000% ECO. So another variable that should be examined is the 
urgency behind a contract, or to be more specific, more of its “story”; this is often not a 
measurable data point, but has a huge impact on total amounts. If more of the story is 
able to be told it is very possible that contracts could in fact be a great source for 
predicting variability. But, the classification of ECO should be broken down further into 
sub-ECO’s in order to make sure for example, ECO’s added due to mission creep, as in 
the program getting more capabilities are not the same as a software update required by 
the manufacturer. Both are necessary and both can be considered ECO’s; however, 
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mission creep has a much larger impact on the overall bottom line. Reading into the story 
is the key to cost estimating.  
Future Research 
• A case study, using EDA to further dive into the exact reasons for cost growth 
without classifying them into the larger more accepted “blanket reasons” for cost 
growth. This should build fewer (based on the time constraints of sifting through 
contracts) but much more precise data points and thus re-accomplishing the 
multiple regression above. 
• A study looking in the time ECO’s are applied into programs life cycles, and if 
that has an impact on the growth. 
• A numeric study of management reserves, it seems like a large portion of DoD 
Special Program Offices (SPO’s), simply place the ECO’s into MR’s so a study 
into the accuracy of MR’s over time and what impacts ECO’s have on them.  
Summary  
 In conclusion, we completed our research by discussing the findings, placing 
emphasis on the relevancy of the findings, and presenting its usefulness in a real work 
setting. Second, we described the studies shortcomings and limitations as well as their 
impact on the results. Next, we described possible future research for the field regarding 
ECO’s and cost growth, which may overcome some of the elements that held this specific 
study back.  
 We recommend the use of the logistic regression tool to predict whether or not a 
contract will need an ECO to be factored into its creation. This can be important as to 
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even if the correct amount may not be readily available the programs that show that they 
will have an ECO can be monitored more closely than those that do not. We can offer a 
guideline as to the amount, which is that of 22.5% as a base amount plus the other 
variables. With further research, our model, could be substantiated. But for the moment, 
we designate it as exploratory.  We recommend the contracting personnel do their own 
research to determine their specific program’s ECO amount due to the lack of ability to 
verify our models accuracy.  
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Appendix E 
 
 
Binary Variables: 
 
 Branch: 1 for yes 0 for no. 
 
• Air Force 
• Navy 
• Marine Corp  
• Army 
• DoD 
 
Commodity: 1 if present 0 if not 
 
• Aircraft 
• AIS 
• Decoy 
• Electronics 
• Ground Vehicle 
• Gun 
• Laser 
• Missiles 
• Munitions 
• Non-Lethal 
• Radar 
• Ship 
• Target/Drones 
• Space 
Contract Type 
 
• FFP-Firm Fixed Price 
• FPIF-Fixed Price Incentive Fee 
• CPFF-Cost Plus Fixed Fee 
• CPIF-Cost Plus Incentive Fee 
• T&M- Time and Materials 
• Cost- Cost of Contract 
Numeric Variable 
• <%5M-If Contract is less than 5 Million receives 1 if not 0 
• >500M-If Contract is greater than 5 Million receives 1 if not 0 
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Appendix F 
  
Breusch-Pagan Test 
α = 0.1 
n = 674 
Model Df = 5 
SSE = 36.128 
SSM (Residuals Squared) = .621 
T.S. = 107.122 
p-value = 1.661 E-21 
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